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ABSTRAK
Walaupun berhasil mendapatkan suara terbanyak di Jakarta pada pemilihan umum 
tahun 2004, PKS nampak sulit untuk mewujudkan keuntungan politik tersebut dan 
mendapatkan kekuasaan eksekutif dengan memenangkan pemilihan kepala daerah 
di Jakarta. Setelah kekalahan dengan selisih yang relatif tipis pada pemilihan kepala 
daerah tahun 2007, kandidat dari partai tersebut juga gagal untuk bersaing dengan kan-
didat lain di putaran kedua pada pemilihan kepala daerah berikutnya. Dengan mener-
apkan beberapa teori yang menjelaskan kandidat bekerja di pemilihan lokal, tulisan 
ini mendiskusikan beberapa kemungkinan penjelasan mengenai kegagalan Hidayat 
Nur Wahid, kandidat dari PKS, pada pemilihan kepala daerah di Jakarta pada tahun 
2012. Tulisan ini berpendapat bahwa walaupun ada kemungkinan faktor agama, dalam 
hal ini Islam, bekerja di dalamnya, bukanlah kandidat dari partai Islam seperti PKS 
yang terdepan dalam memanfaatkannya mengingat ada faktor lain yang juga bekerja 
seperti karakter pribadi, sumber politik dan faktor media. Dalam kasus ini, kegagalan 
untuk menawarkan kandidat dengan kemampuan untuk mengatasi masalah-masalah 
perkotaan merupakan faktor yang membuat pemilih perkotaan untuk cenderung tidak 
berada pada pihak kandidat dari partai Islam, walaupun mereka memiliki kesamaan 
identitas relijius.  
Kata kunci: politik perkotaan, partai Islam, kandidat partai, pemilihan kepala daerah, 
identitas relijius
ABSTRACT
Despite its success in obtaining more votes in the 2004 general election in Jakarta than 
the previous election in 1999, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) has turn its voter sup-
port into local executive power by winning a gubernatorial election in the capital. After 
a narrow defeat in the 2007 local election, the party’s candidate who had a respectable 
reputation also failed to further its bid for the second round of the following local elec-
tion. By applying the existing possible explanations of urban candidacy in local elec-
tions, this paper aims at discussing the possible explanations for the failure of Hidayat 
Nur Wahid, the PKS candidate, in the 2012 gubernatorial election. The paper argues 
that in spite of the likely influence of religion, in this case, Islam, the party’s candidate is 
at the forefront position to maximise it since such other factors as personal character, 
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political resources and media are playing role in this context. In this case, the failure 
to offer a candidate with the capacity to tackle urban problems makes urban voters 
unlikely to be on their side, although they share the similar religious identity.   
Keywords: urban politics, Islamic party, party candidate, local election, religious identity
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INTRODUCTION
In the study of urban politics, the analysis of Islamist’s involvement in 
city electoral process is relatively rare, leaving mostly on the cases of 
Turkish RP (Refah Partisi – Welfare Party) and AKP (Adalet ve Kalkin-
ma Partisi– Justice and Development Party) and Lebanese Hezbollah. 
The rarity is surely understandable since democratic process, a possible 
arena for Islamic political organizations or movements to compete is 
hardly found in majority of Islamic countries in the region. Only fol-
lowing the recent uprising in the Middle East have more opportunities 
existed for increasingly competitive elections. However, it will take more 
time, years if not decades, to develop stable and consolidated democracy 
and transfer it to local level. The political changing in several Middle 
Eastern countries known as the Arab Spring has offered a little to pro-
vide competitive political arena and seeking more cases of Islamists’ 
activism in a local electoral is becoming even more challenging. 
In Turkey, there are several studies focusing on the way the ‘Islamic 
movement’ positions itself in urban politics. At the social level, the 
Gülen movement, also known as Hizmet, is one of the major social 
forces in mobilising religious citizens to penetrate public sphere (e.g. 
Yavuz 2013; Topal 2013) whilst at political level, the RP and AKP domi-
nate the dynamics of urban politics by winning significant numbers of 
local election in many cities (e.g. Gulalp 1999; Çarkoglu 2009). The 
most influential person in contemporary Turkish politics, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, is a product of local politics after securing the governorship 
of Istanbul in 1994, from where he developed his popularity through 
impressive leadership in the city of more than ten million residents 
(Çınar 1997). Social and anthropological studies have investigated the 
growing influence of the RP and AKP perceived to have the Islamic 
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background. They also investigated the ability to be part of daily life 
expression in urban areas (White 2005), representing and helping lower-
income citizens in squatter areas (Yalcintan and Erbas 2003, 100-101); 
and combining with increasing number of middle class with more re-
ligious character (Insel 2003; Yavuz 2006) as the contributing factors 
of their increasing popularity. Those aspects are significant in the in-
creasing political support to the RP, until its closure in 1998, and the 
AKP from 2002 until recently, at least in maintaining power through 
electoral triumph.   
A number of studies on Muslim activism in local context has been 
conducted by scholars. However, only a few countries have been men-
tioned in the urban political studies in Islamist activism. Bayat’s stud-
ies (1996, 2005, & 2007) proposed the term post-Islamism to bring 
additional social aspects of urban Muslim’s life where new forms of 
Islamism grow. In this term, Islamism is all about social expression, not 
necessarily politics, of Muslims in big cities referring to the growing 
role of open and public space in Iran, especially Tehran, with some 
aspects of the rising of Islamic influence at a social level in urban areas 
in Egypt. Another study conducted by Ismail (2000) focuses on the Is-
lamic activism in the urban setting of Cairo. Nevertheless, the activists 
studied in the article are challenging the local government outside the 
system and considering applying violent approach rather than getting 
involved in formal local party politics and elections.  Thus with only 
limited opportunity for free and competitive election in urban areas 
in the region, the possibility of examining the involvement of Islamic 
movement is relatively limited.  However, it is remarkable to see rare 
studies of Islamist political activities in unlikely place such as Saudi and 
Israel cities. In Saudi Arabia, Kraetzschmar (2010) is able to capture 
the Islamist success in mobilizing urban votes whereas, in Israel, Peled 
(2001) sees how the Islamist movement spreads its influence at Israel’s 
municipal as well as national levels. 
Despite Indonesia’s relatively minor position in the study of Muslims 
in general, with its new democratic regime, it offers more opportunity 
in looking for Islamic movements or organizations competing in more 
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regular and stable electoral process. The opportunity only came nearly 
two decades ago in 1998 when Soeharto stepped down after 32 years 
in power. Indonesia then entered the Reform Era and since then it 
has strived to develop a more open political landscape by embracing 
democracy in spite of the fact that it has to encounter several major 
obstacles (King 2003). It is now categorized as a free country in Free-
dom House index to replace Thailand and Malaysia that have been 
previously categorised as free country in Southeast Asia. In local areas, 
it brought significant changes when the amended constitution and new 
laws require a direct election at every local level of province, city, and 
regency (Antlov 2002). Despite all suspicious flaws indicated by scholars 
(Mietzner & Aspinall 2010, 5-8), every level of local elections now has 
at least two electoral events directly electing a governor and mayor or 
regent to win the executive positions by popular votes. Therefore, the 
local elections are still competitive for the parties and candidates. 
Hence, Indonesian local elections now become an excellent place 
for examining the dynamic of Islamic parties in urban politics, espe-
cially in city elections, as the country has experienced regular elections 
at the local level for almost two decades. Among five Islamic or Muslim 
based parties, the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – Prosperous Justice 
Party) captured more attention as it succeeded to garner 23 percent 
of votes in the capital Jakarta and became the most popular party in 
the 2004 general election in the capital city. The party mostly sup-
ported by young Muslim activists in major urban areas was established 
following the fall of the authoritarian regime. Categorically, the PKS 
represents Islamist movements in Indonesia (Hasan 2012) and for the 
party, the achievement should be materialized into local political suc-
cess by winning the gubernatorial position. However, the mission failed 
at the gubernatorial election in 2007 although its candidate gained 
44% of votes as the rest of 19 parties united to support their sole can-
didate (Woodward 2008). After losing the 2007 Jakarta election with a 
relatively narrow gap, the party has recorded a number of setbacks in 
elections in the capital, either at local or national level. Its candidate 
in the 2012 election only secured 11 percent and failed to proceed to 
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second round; this was way below its 19 percent in the 2009 national 
election. It marked the failure to either transform its previous success 
or at least maintain its popular support in the national elections as it 
dropped to third place in 2014 national election with only 11 percent 
of votes. Therefore, there is a significant circumstance to look at the 
PKS’s performance in the capital as it gradually loses supporters from 
one election to another.
This paper aims to look at the performance of the PKS in the 2012 
Jakarta gubernatorial election to represent the challenges confronted 
by Islamist party in relatively competitive urban politics with predomi-
nantly Muslim voters. The party is a good case to be examined due 
to its achievement in becoming the most popular party in the 2004 
general election in Jakarta and its garnering 42 percent of the votes for 
its gubernatorial candidate in 2007. With these achievements, there was 
optimism among party members that it would have good performance 
in the 2012 gubernatorial election as well. At least, it should have been 
able to maintain its 19 percent of the votes at 2009 national election. 
However, despite its potency to seize or at least be competitive for this 
strategic position, the party’s candidate failed to attract adequate votes 
in Jakarta even to qualify for the second round. In general picture, the 
investigation on how the party’s candidate strived to position and cam-
paign in front of the public for a local election can reveal the problem-
atic nature of an Islamic party in the democratic process. By looking at 
its 2012 candidacy in a bid to win the local election, this paper argues 
that religious identity is not a guarantee for an Islamic party to convince 
the majority of Muslim voters in the capital whose Muslim population 
is around 85 percent. Consequently, other factors that also influence the 
voters inside the ballot box in the context of local urban politics must be 
taken into account accordingly. Miichi (2014) suggests the importance 
of religion in the Jakarta’s gubernatorial election where the two pairs 
going through the second round had strived to carefully manage their 
ties to Islam at different degrees. However, applying his argument to a 
party that is already Islamic seems peculiar as it sees Islam as a trump 
card for its magnitude of performance in the local election. 
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POLITICA L PA RT Y, CA NDIDATE, 
A ND LOCA L ELECTION
What are other voting-related elements that could be influential factors 
in the local urban elections? Examining local elections using behav-
ioral approach is one of the major methods of studying urban politics 
since the 1960s. Although new paradigms such as neo-Marxists’ urban 
protest dimension and international dimension of economic force to the 
electoral process have been developed significantly, the behavioral ap-
proach has still survived alongside rational choice theory and discourse 
analysis (Stoker 1998).
Despite its prolonged research, the behavioral study of the local elec-
tion is still underdeveloped compared to the national level. Although 
there are already several studies and data collection that have been 
conducted by political scientists (Marschall, Shah & Ruhil 2011, 1), the 
situation since the 1960s and 1970s remains unchanged until recently 
(Stoker 1998, 127). In the context of Indonesia, most of the studies are 
focusing on political process on how candidates organized and arranged 
their campaign strategies in relation to the consolidation of democracy 
(Buehler 2009). In particular, they are focusing on how democracy 
works in a local election in relation to the dynamics of party politics 
(Choi 2004, 2005). Both are using a qualitative approach to explore 
the dynamics of a personal network and the role of the political party 
in the elections of Riau, Yogyakarta, and Toraja. Their research reveals 
that the personality of candidates is important to win a local election. 
However, at the same time, a political party also plays a great role. The 
degree of both personal and institutional is different though, depending 
on the area where the election takes place. The research conducted by 
Buehler (2009) in Toraja, South Sulawesi finds that an area dominated 
by agricultural and rural cultures still holds admiration at a certain level 
to aristocracy and tends to undermine the role of an institution such as 
a political party. However, Indonesian politics at the elite level is also 
marked by the willingness of a political party to influence the political 
process in a local election. This finding is confirmed in Choi’s research 
in Riau and Yogyakarta. However, despite the eagerness of local party 
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elites to influence the local politics, the research using quantitative 
approach shows that the final decision is at the hand of the voters. 
Mujani and Liddle (2012), for example, confirm this conclusion that 
the voters are keener to have greater space to evaluate the contestants 
in an election, although their research is based on the general election. 
Nevertheless, in many cases, including Indonesia, local elections do not 
always replicate what the party or candidate has achieved at the national 
level. As the local elections are designed to choose individuals or pairs 
to secure executive positions, candidacy becomes an additional factor 
besides party itself. Hence, focusing on the importance of candidate 
for the voters is more important. 
In the discussion of local elections, several studies confirm the im-
portance of candidate in the eye of voters. Many believe that in local 
election candidate is more significant to attract voters to represent them 
in the national parliament. This underlines the difference between 
local and national elections in term of the role of candidate. In the 
British case, it is revealed that the personal aspects of candidate only 
have a modest influence on his or her votes in the national election 
(Norris, Vallance, & Lovenduski 2002). Another study in Canada also 
confirms that local candidate only influences an insignificant number 
of Canadian voters  (Blais 2003), but again it is based on the election for 
national representation. Different from the national or federal election, 
in elections for local chief executive such as governor, mayor, or regent, 
the candidate’s credentials are far more essential. In the US experience, 
for instance, a candidate for governor may have to struggle to raise 
funds and to develop a network of volunteers to help in or with the cam-
paign. A political party is not playing a great role and sometimes leaves 
candidates of the same party to compete in the same local election.
In the context of Indonesia, only very few studies, if any, investigate 
factors that influence voters in choosing a candidate during a campaign. 
Hence, to initiate the study of how a candidate wins local election this 
study uses analyses that have been discussed in other local election 
in a more advanced democracy. One of the handful efforts to sum-
marise possible factors of how a candidate in local election wins is 
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conducted by Lieske (1989) who puts them into conclusive factors based 
on legitimacy theory. He mentioned three factors that contribute for 
an individual candidate to get more votes: ascribed (sex, age, religion 
& ethnic) and achieved (education & occupation) personal character; 
political resources (incumbency & campaign expenditures); and the 
partisan and newspaper endorsement received (Lieske 1989, 153). This 
paper will discuss these three factors to find the possible explanation 
of the PKS declining popularity in Jakarta.
R ESEA RCH METHOD
To support the argument, this article looks into data related to factors 
for urban candidacy in a local election. Three factors are explored in 
this article as they are likely to play a role in the Jakarta gubernatorial 
election in 2012 and all data are obtained from secondary sources that 
are available in many sources from previous reports, scientific articles, 
as well as news in media. However, not all data are available in these 
written sources. To analyze the tendency of candidates in relation to 
media and public, their campaign media on the internet, as well as the 
presence of each candidate in one of the internet search engines, are 
explored. In general, this method is located within a qualitative method 
and more specifically, case study as it aims at elaborating a specific 
topic in a case. Consequently, there will be no general conclusion that 
can be generated from the case in 2012 as it has different contexts and 
complexities when compared to other gubernatorial elections in the 
capital. However, this case study may offer a distinct proposition for 
further discussion on urban local candidacy.  
THE PKS A ND ELECTIONS IN INDONESI A
The PKS is an Islamic party that was established in 2002 as a continua-
tion of the PK following the fall of Soeharto and his New Order regime 
in 1998. The PK was established immediately after the opportunity 
was available by the new government but failed to pass the electoral 
threshold after gaining only 1.8 percent of votes in the 1999 general 
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election. Consequently, it had to change into the PKS in order to be 
able to participate in the next election. It was part of the new era in 
Indonesian politics to introduce political reform based on democratic 
principles. The new reformed regime has given opportunities for the 
ideological party to establish and involve in a competitive political pro-
cess, especially in an election. After being oppressed by the previous 
regime, Islam is still the most attractive source of values, other than 
Pancasila, for the new parties and among 48 contestants for the 1999 
elections 12 of them declared Islam as their ideology while another 
eight aimed Islamic voters as their target (Fatah 1999, 132). However, 
only five of them could survive obtaining minimum votes to pass the 
electoral threshold to secure seats in the parliament. In total these five 
parties received 37 percent of votes. After five years in politics, there was 
no significant improvement when their votes were stagnant in the 2004 
general election. The performance of Islamic parties was even worse 
in 2009 as their votes dropped to slightly less than 30 percent (Aspinall 
2010, 105-106), which was seen by some scholars as the decline of Is-
lamic parties in Indonesia’s electoral process (Fealy 2009) although still 
have significant influence in political life (Tanuwidjaya 2010).
Despite the relatively low achievement of Islamic parties in general 
in the national elections, the PKS has recorded different outcomes. 
First, in the 2004 election, the party significantly increased its votes 
from 1.6 to 7.34 percent. Second, it performed well in several big cities 
when it became the most popular party in Bogor, Bekasi, Bandung, 
Medan, and the capital Jakarta. It is believed that the success was part 
of the ability of the party to capitalize on the demand to have a better 
Indonesia. At that time this was a general feeling among many voters 
after the reform era and the hope was expected to be fulfilled by the 
party’s image of ‘clean and caring’ (Nurdin 2010, p. 543-544). This 
image was attractive enough for many first-time voters as well as the 
middle class in urban areas who were fed up with corrupted politicians 
and ineffective bureaucrats. This is one of the explanatory factors of why 
the party was able to get more votes in big cities rather than rural areas. 
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After relatively successful electoral participation until 2004, the party 
has faced a difficult time when its involvement in the Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono cabinet brought the party into problematic positions. When 
dealing with an unpopular policy such as increasing the gasoline price 
in 2005 for instance, at first the PKS strongly opposed and criticised it, 
a position admired by the public. However, the PKS finally accepted the 
policy after having a meeting with the President. Since then, the party 
seems to have lost its promising image of the reform party. It was not 
able to repeat the 2004 success in the 2009 general election. The lat-
ter election was relatively stagnant where the party lost its position as a 
popular party in big cities. Only because of its ability to penetrate more 
regions (provinces) the party could maintain its votes at the level of 7.88 
percent (Hidayat 2009). The stagnation of the PKS was also partly due 
to the corruption scandals allegedly involving  some of its prominent 
figures as mentioned before (Aspinall 2010, 106), an opposite image of 
the party’s commitment to the jargon of ‘clean party.’ This image seems 
to fall completely when its president, Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, and one of 
its governors, Gatot Pujo Nugroho, was taken into custody by KPK (Cor-
ruption Eradication Commission) in 2014 and 2015 and put on trial for 
graft and bribery. The first was related to raw beef import allocations 
and the case was opened by the Commission only weeks before the 
2014 national election. While this case was strongly rejected by most 
of the party cadres, toward the second, the cadres were relatively calm 
accepting the fact that religion and the jargon of ‘clean party’ cannot 
guarantee its party elites not to commit immoral and unlawful behavior 
while in office .
The decline of its popularity in big cities can be seen at the PKS’s 
performance in the local elections, especially in Jakarta. Following the 
success in the 2004 election, the party strived to compete in the local 
elections in the capital. There are two local elections in which the party 
involved by offering its own candidates, in 2007 and 2012. The local 
election in 2007 was the first direct election in the capital to choose 
a governor and vice governor and the PKS nominated Deputy Chief 
police force, Adang Daradjatun, to compete with former vice-governor, 
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Fauzi Bowo. All parties in the capital supported the latter candidate to 
impede the PKS possible domination over Jakarta, which is seen as ‘a 
honey pot’ (Schonhardt 2012) that control a local budget of almost $22 
million at that time. Although the party’s candidate was able to attract 
44 percent of votes, it was not enough to beat the opponent and the par-
ty lost its momentum following its strong legislative election showing.
The second attempt was in the 2012 local election when the party 
also put forth a candidate for the governorship. However, unlike 2007, 
PKS did not enter the arena as the favourite.  The PKS slipped into the 
third position after the PD (Partai Demokrat or Democrat Party) and 
PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or Indonesian Demo-
cratic Party of Struggle) in the local parliament. Although it had of-
fered its most popular cadre at the national level, Hidayat Nur Wahid, 
who is a former head of MPR (Majelis Permusyawarakatan Rakyat or 
People’s Consultative Assembly) from 2004 to 2009, the result was still 
disappointing. Paired with an economist affiliated with PAN (Partai 
Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party), they only received 11 
percent of the vote, finished in third place and thus failed to compete 
in the second round. 
The party’s performance in two local elections is disappointing 
considering its popularity in Jakarta after the 2004 general election 
and the 2007 local election. Other than its popularity, there are also 
several positive expressions being addressed to the PKS to admire the 
party’s distinctive character. Nakamura (2005), for example, explains 
that it has the image of hope after its criticism toward corruption and 
its commitment to social welfare. This image, according to him, has 
attracted many members of the younger generation in the urban areas, 
as the party is also associated with the well-educated and the middle 
class who strongly prefer its non-violent message. Therefore, it also has 
the image of promising improvement as it is associated with the spirit 
of reform and transformation in keeping with Islamic values. It is the 
only Islamic party perceived to be different yet in the same box as ‘red 
parties’ as this party offers substantial change (Fatah 1999).
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In short, the PKS has been able to transform Islamic values into 
imagination and activities that can be understood universally by the 
public. Different from other Islamic parties that clearly symbolize their 
identities and program as ‘Islamic’, the party chose to adopt universal 
values of Islam as their identity. The word Keadilan (Justice) and Se-
jahtera (Prosperous) refers to Islamic universal goals. The party’s ap-
proach to Islamic interpretation also follows the moderate, non-violent 
and social ideology of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
Although the relationship between achievement in the national and 
local election is seen as insignificant by scholars, the failure to maintain 
the party’s popularity in Jakarta as reflected in the defeat of two local 
elections is still noteworthy to be explored. As a city with the predomi-
nant population of Muslim and Betawi being the native community 
associated with the religion, the PKS identity as an Islamic party and 
universal interpretation of the religion should be beneficial to attract 
many votes in the elections. The fact that religion played a role in the 
dynamics of a local election in the capital shows the potency that could 
be maximised by the party.
However, the 2012 gubernatorial election was held in a relatively 
gloomy picture of Islamic parties. During the year, there were several 
surveys examining the popularity of political parties in Indonesia. For 
Islamic and Muslim based parties, the result of a survey conducted by 
the Indonesian Circle Survey (LSI) showed that they would only garner 
21 percent of votes if the general election were held in September (the 
Jakarta Posts, 15 October 2012). More strikingly, none of the Islamic or 
Muslim based parties is in the top five and they would only be voted 
by less than five percent of respondents. Another survey conducted 
by National Survey Institute in early October 2012 also indicated the 
similar trend that the PKS would only receive 4.4 percent of the vote 
and the support for Islamic and Muslim based parties would be slightly 
above ten percent (Osman 2012). Although the pre-election survey has 
several aspects to be debated in term of methodology and the fact that 
there are a significant number (around 36 percent) of undecided voters, 
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the findings have indicated that Islamic parties are less attractive when 
the local election in Jakarta was held.   
It is then understandable that the PKS nominated Hidayat Nur Wa-
hid to enter the competition in order to reclaim its past glory in Jakarta 
(the Jakarta Posts, 2 June 2012). He has a good reputation and claims 
respect among the party’s members and Indonesian public after serv-
ing as the head of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat - People’s 
Consultative Assembly in the period of 2004 – 2009, although his role 
was limited only to lead less than ten times of joint meeting between 
the lower house and Senate. However, despite his respective figure as 
former head of the Assembly and humble person with a strong back-
ground as an intellectual in Islamic studies, his nomination failed to 
attract significant votes in Jakarta.
After three general elections in Indonesia since its first in 1999, it 
is revealed that the new tendency of party identification was still rela-
tively significant. On the contrary, the latest election was also marked 
by the growing of evaluation on political parties after two periods of 
government under direct president elections (Mujani & Liddle 2012). 
Indonesians now have a chance to evaluate the party’s performance and 
the main basis of the assessment is the economic situation that they 
experience affecting legitimacy of political parties and their candidates 
in local elections.
DISCUSSING THE PKS’S CA NDIDATE IN 2012 
JA K A RTA GUBER NATOR I A L ELECTION
Ascribed Personal Factor
Lieske clearly mentions that the personal factor is a key in a local elec-
tion, not in general election to represent a particular region in national 
level. This is also the case in Jakarta that the electoral supports for a 
party in the general election do not have a direct relationship with the 
result for a candidate in the gubernatorial election.
The PKS has been supported by 23 percent of votes in the 2004 elec-
tion and 18 percent in the 2009 election. In local parliament, or DPRD 
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(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or Local People’s Representative 
House), the PKS obtains 18 seats in both 2004 and 2009. However, 
from 2004 to 2009 the local parliament had 75 seats in total and it was 
expanded to 100 since then. Therefore, the proportion of the party’s 
representation had declined from 24 as the leading party to 18 percent 
in third place.  
However, on many occasions, the party had expressed optimism that 
its candidate would win the election based on the result of the national 
election and expected that voters’ electoral preference was relatively 
constant. For the latter, one of the arguments is that in the previous 
local election, the PKS candidate had garnered 44 percent of votes 
which would support its candidate again in 2012. The President of the 
PKS said on one occasion, “Now they are split into six pairs, while the 
PKS remains unmoved. We will maintain our constituents and win 
the Jakarta” (Dipa 2012). His comment was directed to the fact that 
there are six pairs of candidates for the election and assumed that the 
44 percent of votes for Adang Daradjatun, the PKS candidate in 2007, 
still support the party’s candidate in 2012. Another tendency in relation 
to a local election is calculating the national election votes for local 
election, vice versa. After the party’s member won the North Sumatra 
local election in March 2013, the new President explained that the 
province is a miniature of Indonesia because of its plurality. ‘Winning 
the province’ to get gubernatorial position ‘is a sign that the PKS is ac-
cepted in plural society and in the future, our party will be accepted 
in more plural society’ (Asril 2013). 
In the case of Jakarta gubernatorial election, it is clear that candidate 
is the main source of voters’ choice in the ballot box, not the party. The 
table below confirms the assumption that political party is not the fac-
tor for a candidate to win the local election in gubernatorial position.
The table below clearly reveals that party identification in Jakarta 
is relatively weak, which confirms the findings of Mujani and Liddle’s 
research after the 2009 national election. The favorite candidate and 
incumbent, Fauzi Bowo, had a wide range of support with the PD as 
his major party combining with two Muslim based parties, the PKB and 
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PAN. If party identification worked and Jakartans followed the political 
line of those parties, he should have received approximately 42 percent 
of votes. In fact, he was only supported by 34.05 percent, 8 percent less. 
The case of the first round winner, Joko Widodo, is more convincing 
in this context because the voters are not completely in parallel with 
the political party’s stance. While he was only supported by the PDIP 
and Gerindra with only 15.9 percent of votes in the 2009 general elec-
tion in Jakarta, he could gain more than 46 percent three years later. 
Therefore, demonstration that party identification is difficult to find in 
local election may be seen in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election. 
Table 1 
Result of Jakarta Gubernatorial election
Candidates Supportive Political Party 1st round 2nd round
Potential 
votes*
Result (%) Potential 
votes**
Result
(%)
Fauzi Bowo – 
Nachrowi Ramli
PD, PKB, PAN, Hanura, 
faction in PDS 
42.32 34.05 52.42 46.18
Hendardji Soepandji – A 
R Patria
Independent 1.98
Joko Widodo – 
Basuki T P
PDIP, Gerindra 15.9 42.60 42.60 53.82
Hidayat Nur Wahid – 
Didik J Rachbini
PKS 17.23 11.72
Faisal Basri – 
Biem T Benjamin
Independent 4.98
Alex Noerdin –
Nono Sampono
Golkar, PPP, faction in 
PDS
11.62 4.67
Source: KPU Jakarta 
* based on the 2009 general election for Jakarta 
** based on votes in the first round and supports of other candidates
For many spectators, this phenomenon is perceived as a positive sign 
that rationality is growing among the voters to abandon ascribed identity 
of the candidates as an important electoral factor and seek for a better 
candidate to lead Jakarta (Basuki 2012). This is also confirmed by the 
fact that the legitimacy some candidates wanted to develop had also 
failed to work effectively. Fauzi Bowo and his vice governor candidate, 
Nachrowi Ramli, are Betawi, the native people of Jakarta who are then 
perceived by the Betawis as a legitimate candidate to lead the capital. 
Based on this, Fauzi Bowo deliberately maximised the image of being 
a native that is also associated with Islam to attract other non-native 
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Muslims. In a cosmopolitan city of Jakarta, this strategy to represent Be-
tawi identity may have displeased other ethnic groups (Sukarsono 2012).
Hidayat Nur Wahid also had a similar strategy in maximising the 
identification with people of Jakarta. If the incumbent maximised eth-
nic identity and religion, he and his vice candidate preferred orange as 
their identical color in combination with Batik motif. Batik is a widely 
known motive strongly related with Javanese, a dominant ethnic group 
in Jakarta with around 35.5 percent of the Jakartans. He and his team 
deliberately chose the color and the motive to attract two different iden-
tities at the same time: football supporters and Javanese (in Jakarta, the 
most popular footbal team is identified with orange) and Javanese. 
It is quite common in Indonesia that football is often used for po-
litical purpose. There are cases that local leaders helped to support a 
popular football club in their region in order to gain popularity. This 
strategy also used by the PKS candidate in West Java when Ahmad 
Heryawan unexpectedly won the governor position by choosing blue as 
his color during a campaign in 2008. It is not a coincidence that blue is 
the color of a very popular football club in the province’s capital: Persib 
Bandung. Therefore, depicting a particular color is crucial to develop 
identification with popular preference. In the case of West Java, this 
strategy worked at some points, apart from the significant factor of his 
vice candidate, popular actor Dede Yusuf who was the cadre of the PAN 
symbolically recognized by blue color.
That is one of the likely reasons of why Wahid did not develop his 
image with Islam strongly as the voters were assumed to know him as 
the candidate of an Islamic party. The color of orange is not regarded 
as the color of Islam that is otherwise characterized by white or green. 
By choosing the color, it was expected that he and his party were able to 
penetrate different potential voters who have less association with Islam. 
It is also a strategy to reduce suspicion that the PKS and its members are 
are strict Muslims along the lines of the Wahhabism fostered by Saudi 
Arabia. The term is negatively perceived by even by many Muslims in 
Indonesia as ‘traditionalist’ particularly characterized by the idea of the 
Islamic state of the party (Sukmajati 2011).  
21AN ISLAMIC PARTY IN URBAN POLITICS
However, his strategy ran ineffective because other factors and can-
didates undermined this symbolization. Although football supporters of 
Persija are significant, the year of 2012 was marked by severe conflict of 
PSSI, the national football authority, that led to the division of football 
league, including the most popular club in the capital: Persija. There, 
enthusiasm toward football activities was insignificant and replaced by 
condemnation rather than support or admiration. While at the same 
time, his effort to attract Javanese voters was challenged by the figure 
of Joko Widodo, a mayor of Solo who can represent Javanese identity as 
well. Although Wahid did not encourage this ethnic sentiment strongly 
and Joko Widodo did not take the same strategies as well, the latter posi-
tion as mayor of Solo significantly undermined Wahid’s association with 
Javanese. Solo is the cultural capital of Javanese in Central Java prov-
ince, while Klaten, the hometown of Wahid, is only a peripheral town 
in Javanese ideas. Moreover, such strategy is perceived as conventional 
and it can be easily overcome by the attractive strategy as practiced by 
Jokowi. Jokowi and Purnama easily got more attention in this field by 
using more eye-catching shirt: red-and-white checked shirts. The sym-
bolization of this pattern is more convincing for the voters as it gave the 
impression of candidates of the people (Fealy 2013, 108) 
In short, for Jakartans, the ascribed identity of the candidate is nei-
ther ethnicity nor religiosity (Basuki 2012). They also have loose loyalty 
to a political party when they have to choose a person to tackle the 
daily life of Jakarta and manage its problems. Religiosity for Indonesian, 
in general, is embraced in moderate interpretation and every Muslim 
does not have any obligation to follow her/his religion’s teaching when 
it comes to political aspiration. The position is taken by two major 
Islamic social organizations of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muham-
madiyah which then become the stumbling block of any Islamic party 
to penetrate Muslims in Indonesian because the majority of them, or 
75 percent, describe themselves as having an association with those two 
organisations, whether active or passive (Mujani 2004). 
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Achieved Personal Factor
Another personal character that is relevant to influence voters is the 
achievement that is what a candidate has achieved in her/his education 
or occupation. In this aspect, Wahid and his vice candidate have signifi-
cant benefits since they hold doctorate degrees in Islamic studies and 
economics. Wahid spent his school in pesantren, an Islamic boarding 
school, before he flew to Madinah for his doctorate degree. His vice 
candidate is known as an academic who holds doctorate degree from a 
university in the Philippines. Before serving as a lawmaker from 2004 
to 2009 with the PAN, he taught in several universities and became a 
respectable economic analyst. No other candidates have similar cred-
ibility in term of achievement in education, except Fauzi Bowo. 
Wahid is also nationally known as a respectable politician from the 
PKS. Following the success to increase seats in parliament in 2004, 
the PKS was able to grab the position of head of People’s Consulta-
tive Assembly, a joint institution of House of Representatives and DPD 
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah – Regional Representative Council) a US 
Senate-like institution. During his leadership, he showed to the public 
that he was a humble person who was willing to refuse state facilities 
(Kompas, 14 October 2004). The public had praised his attitude, as 
it was an unusual behavior of politicians in Indonesian political life. 
He was also the candidate for House of Representative who received 
enough votes to claim his seat from Central Java in the parliament 
directly in the 2004 national election. In the election, candidates for 
the House had to gained minimum of BPP (Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih 
or known in single transferable vote system as Hare quota) to get the 
seat without depending on transfer of vote from other candidates from 
similar party in the same district. Only two lawmakers (the other law-
maker is Saleh Djasit) in the parliament who were able to have similar 
performance and he was one of them.By having those achievements 
and records, the party was hoping that it could attract the middle class 
in Jakarta because it offered well-educated candidates. In addition, the 
PKS was also aware that it had to win the Jakarta election to boost its 
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confidence in preparation of national election in 2014. Winning the 
capital is a strategic political benefit that may deliver the party to be-
come a major political player in Indonesian politics. After unproductive 
negotiations with other possible candidates before the PKS announced 
Wahid’s candidacy, the party strived hard to find agreement with Fauzi 
Bowo to accept the party’s member as his vice gubernatorial candidate. 
Failing that, the PKS had to embrace the election without any support 
from other parties, similar to the 2007 local election. However, the 2012 
election was more competitive due to the quality of candidates who ap-
plied for the election. Other than Fauzi Bowo, the incumbent governor, 
there was also Alex Noerdin, the governor of South Sumatera. Alex 
was supported by Golkar and had a good reputation in the province 
to provide better services for the residents, especially in education and 
health services. There was also Faisal Basri, a respectable economist 
and academic, who ran in the election as an independent. Faisal was 
widely known as young academic in 1998 to join reform movement 
against Soeharto and joined a party that was established by Amien 
Rais, an important figure in the process of political change (turbulence 
sounds negative) in that year. Therefore, he had the image of having 
brilliant new ideas that may bring changes in Jakarta.
However, among the candidates, Joko Widodo popularly known as 
Jokowi was a contender who had strong appeal to the voters. He was 
accompanied by Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, a Chinese business person. 
Both did not have good education background when compared to Wa-
hid and Fauzi Bowo or Faisal Basri because originally they were active 
in the business sector. However, both had a dazzling record as mayor 
and regent in Solo and East Belitung. Jokowi marked good achieve-
ment in reforming public services in the city of Solo. Purnama also 
had a good record during his regency by providing free health service 
for every resident.
In this aspect, although his personal character is appealing as a well-
educated candidate with a good record of humbleness and religiosity, 
Wahid was unable to attract more votes when compared to what his 
party garnered. His effort to associate himself with the popular football 
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supporters was also ineffective. It is clear that voters in Jakarta were 
not significantly affected by ethnic and religious lines. Of course, a 
candidate such as Fauzi Bowo has influential ties with native people 
and Islam since he had more votes than Wahid who are equally in 
incumbency. In the second round, Jokowi was accused of being a non-
religious person by a popular singer to undermine Muslim votes, a cam-
paign that was also circulated in social media. However, this campaign 
did not have a great impact to Jokowi’s electability due to Indonesian 
voters’ growing rationality, especially in Jakarta (Mujani & Liddle 2010). 
POLITICA L R ESOURCES
In the local candidacy, as Lieske has mentioned, other factor to play a role 
for winning local election is the availability to have political resources 
in the form of incumbency and campaign. If Wahid has the strongest 
appeal on personal factor, in these he and his team had a quite serious 
problem compare to other frontrunner candidates. Lack of incumbency 
and relatively ineffective campaign strategy were quite obvious.
Incumbency
The failure of Wahid’s candidacy is also an obvious example of how 
incumbency is crucial in the aspect of political resources of a candidate. 
Both Jokowi and Purnama have developed reputations for integrity and 
good governance in previous elected positions in other regions (Bev 
2012). This kind of reputation was absent for Wahid. His role as the 
head of People’s Consultative Assembly, although nationally recognized, 
was different from what Jokowi and Purnama had established. As a head 
of the highest institution in Indonesian political hierarchy, his role is 
to lead joint session between two branches of parliament. This was a 
role of managing the session mostly in ceremonial fashion unless there 
is an effort to amend the Indonesian constitution. Moreover, the joint 
session was conducted on very limited occasions of the inauguration 
of the new president and vice president as well as examination of the 
report from previous president. 
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As mayor and regent, Jokowi and Purnama had greater chance to 
conduct activities that were directly related to residents’ needs. Jokowi 
has the reputation of a mayor who was willing to visit every corner of 
his city to meet residents from different levels or groups. One of his 
phenomenal achievements was to relocate street sellers that occupied 
a public place to designated areas. While conflict and clashes are the 
common consequences of relocation in Indonesian urban areas, Jokowi 
was able to relocate them peacefully. This happened due to Jokowi’s 
approach to the sellers after 54 times of meeting to discuss and negotiate 
conditions of the relocation. For the success, Jokowi was invited to pres-
ent the process in one of the UNON forums in Nigeria on 9 April 2009. 
Another candidate, Fauzi Bowo was also an incumbent; while Alex 
Nurdin was the governor of South Sumatera. Their candidacy has re-
sulted in the highly competitive election in term of incumbency. In this 
context, it does not necessarily mean incumbency of Jakarta. It refers to 
the situation that the candidates have served as either governor or mayor 
or regent in a city or regency. Therefore, it is expected that leadership 
experience in local context should enhance their electability.
Alex Noerdin was completely embarrassed as his incumbency did 
not have any impact at all. Wahid had received a better result, but un-
fortunately, it was not enough to boost his votes. He also failed to defeat 
Fauzi Bowo who suffered from a negative reception from the Jakartans 
due to his inability in tackling acute problems of traffic jam and flood 
as well as ineffective bureaucracy. His lack of real candidacy experience 
in dealing with urban problems has resulted in low level of votes.  
Campaign 
For Lieske, the campaign in the examination of candidacy in a local 
election is based on how much money that a candidate spends. By look-
ing at the campaign expenditures it is likely that the different efforts of 
each candidate can be evidently examined. It is hypothesized that hav-
ing much money in an election is measured by the ability to raise more 
funds to support campaign activities. More funds mean that more leaf-
lets can be distributed and more media coverage can be produced. In 
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short, money can be used to ‘buy recognition’ (1989, 155-156). However, 
studies related to the significance of funds for the campaign and then 
winning election have revealed more complex conclusions. It is said that 
money is more important for the challenger than the incumbent (Jacob-
son 1978, 1985, 1990) as the latter can maximise their service to citizen 
or constituent during their term in office or Parliament. Therefore, the 
challenger needs to put more effort to advertise its profile more than 
the incumbent does (Gerber 1998). Thus, analyzing the ability to win 
an election based on candidates’ success to raise more fund does not 
always working straightforward and can be misleading. Although elec-
tions in Indonesia are seen as flawed due to the role of money to buy 
votes before ballot box and after when all votes are counted (Aspinall 
and Mietzner 2010), the way candidates market themselves in front of 
the public is still important in choosing a local leader. In Indonesia, it 
is noted that it can be diverse from ‘pomp’ to ‘piety’ (Lindsay 2009) or 
‘inter-religious’ to ‘inter-ethnic’ (Aspinall, Dettman, & Warburton 2011, 
42-43). However, there is also a tendency that internet-based media also 
played significant role alongside the more common campaign modes. 
Wahid and his success team themselves embraced them too and imple-
mented different types of campaign. 
The most common form of a campaign is a public meeting with the 
mobilisation of hundreds to thousands of cadres and sympathizers in a 
hall or open space which is quite popular in Indonesian elections, either 
local and national. All candidates, including Wahid, are still fond of this 
type of campaign. The PKS that supported him prepared the campaign 
to develop the image of professionalism dominated by orange and ba-
tik design. As usual, this type of PKS campaign was usually attended 
by thousands of its cadres. The party seemed to understand that this 
campaign was actually not too effective in reaching the wider public as 
it was only attended mainly by its cadres. However, the party did it any-
way as the main purpose of having an open campaign (parade) was to 
show the public that the candidate had significant real supporters (can 
also activate your supporters to get them advocating your candidate in 
their neighborhoods). It is also for image building when Wahid visited 
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many places in Jakarta in order to get closer to ordinary people as well 
as community leaders. The traditional market seems to be one of the 
main targets to visit as Wahid would arrive at the site using traditional 
vehicles such as becak, cart, or motorcycle mostly with his trademark 
of orange-colored batik shirt. There are also some occasions that he 
or his vice candidate attended social activities managed by the party’s 
cadre at the community level including native musical performance. 
In the recorded activities, he explained his vision to lead Jakarta under 
the tag of ‘Ayo Beresin Jakarta’ or ‘Let’s Settle the Problems of Jakarta.’
Many of his activities were recorded by his volunteer organized PKS 
TV and then uploaded to YouTube. Perhaps, this is part of their effort 
to reach the voters through the internet, which is easier to access in 
the capital and becomes a new strategy in the local elections for all 
candidates. In conventional theory, it is said that the media endorse-
ment is crucial to the success of the candidate in a local election and 
it can be analyzed from the report and editorial point of view, or me-
dia bias, which can influence the readers (Chiang & Knight 2011). 
However, local elections in Indonesia generally have shown different 
phenomenon as the candidates strived to reach the reader directly. Two 
different strategies applied by different candidates can be underlined 
here. They are Internet-based campaign and greeting the voters directly. 
The first was mainly maximised by Wahid’s campaign team as they 
documented a significant number of Wahid and his running mate’s 
activities in videos and uploaded them on the internet. Varieties of 
videos were also uploaded to the online video service hoping that his 
vision and activities could be accessed by internet users. PKS TV has 
produced approximately 170 short videos and made them available on 
YouTube. It shows that Wahid’s team worked seriously and the party as 
his support helped him. 
However, the videos did not attract significant internet users. Many 
of them were only hit less than one thousand users and only less than 
five were watched by ten thousand users. Although this figure is ob-
viously better than what Fauzi Bowo’s team did with only less than 
30 videos produced by his campaign team and some of them were 
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only watched by less than a hundred, his videos were far less attrac-
tive compared to Jokowi’s videos in YouTube. Gerindra that supported 
Purnama, Jokowi’s his vice gubernatorial candidate, produced some 
videos with more sophisticated quality. One of the videos showing his 
explanation of how he would govern attracted more than a hundred 
thousand internet users. Compared to Hidayat, Jokowi’s explanation 
about how to tackle problems of congestion was more convincing with 
concrete proof of similar problem-solving in Solo during his mayorship. 
His program of health and education service and the way of tackling 
the ineffectiveness of bureaucracy in the city were also successful. He 
claimed that he would deterministically fire a bureaucrat not complying 
with his reform in improving public services. In Solo, many of them 
had been fired accordingly. As usual, he also showed his calmness and 
humbleness during the presentation and sometimes he made laughed 
at his self upon making mistakes. 
Similar to Wahid, there were also some videos uploaded to support 
him and one of them was hit by more than one and half million users 
after it was available on YouTube on 16 August 2012 (Cameo Project 
2012). One of the winners of parody competition produced the high-
quality video and dedicated for Jokowi. Other than that, the video could 
represent the feeling of the Jakartans fed up with chronic problems of 
traffic and corrupt bureaucracy’s failure to tackle the city’s problems. 
It is clear that incumbency is not always a positive factors in winning 
the trust of votes as it may give negative impact for the incumbent to 
confirm scholars’ findings (Anderson & Glomm, 1992). The mostly 
Chinese-descendant participants voluntarily developed the video. They 
even did not know Jokowi before and never met him. According to one 
of the producers the video was produced as an expression of young 
people who wanted to have true change in Jakarta. Besides that, they 
also aimed at endorsing undecided voters to come to the ballot box 
in the second round (Wibowo, 2012). Beyond that, there are also sev-
eral accounts of social media who create account voluntarily to inform 
about Jokowi. He mentions that on twitter there are @jokowicenter, 
@jakarta_bangkit, @jbkaskus, @jakartabaru, @relawanmudajakarta, 
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@info-kemeja, @jokowibasuki, @projakarta, and @rumahrelawanJB 
(Nugroho & Nugroho 2012).
In attracting middle class who have access to the internet, although 
Wahid gained support and produced significant numbers of video, Wa-
hid failed to answer what the Jakartans needed during the campaign. 
Again, attractiveness, message and the ability of a candidate to offer 
tangible breakthrough to voters are significant. To compare, Jokowi and 
Purnama’s campaign could reach different segment more effectively by 
using community visit, social media and introduce popular songs and 
slogans attractive to young voters. The figure below also shows that 
Jakartans who have access more to the internet were more interested 
searching for Jokowi than other candidates. Wahid was simply not the 
candidate to look at by them who were mostly young and middle class. 
In both campaign periods, for the first and second round, Jokowi always 
became the first to search on the internet and it was not comparable 
to others even in the second round when there were only two pairs 
of candidates. Figure 1 below shows the insignificant interest toward 
Wahid in one of internet search engine. 
Figure 1 
Interest on Candidates by using Google Search
Source google.com
In term of campaign expenditures as Lieske has mentioned, there is no 
relation between the amounts of fund used to support the campaign 
with the triumph of the candidate in the 2012 Jakarta election. Ac-
cording to KPU Jakarta, the local election commission, Jokowi as the 
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winner spend 27.05 billion rupiahs for two rounds of the campaign and 
16.09 billion rupiahs for his campaign in the first round, 11 July 2012 
(Afifah 2012). Compared to Fauzi Bowo, the figure is significantly lower 
because the incumbent spends 62.57 billion rupiahs for two rounds. 
Jokowi only spent one billion for programs on TV and radio and most 
of them were cheap campaigns of direct community visit (Teresia & 
Ebo 2012). Jokowi did not like his team producing a huge number of 
banners since it would mess up public space in Jakarta. Wahid himself 
spent only 13 billion rupiahs and most of them were collected from the 
PKS members (Toriq 2012). For the party, the relatively small amount 
of funds for a campaign, especially in media, is one of the main reasons 
for Wahid’s failure. Aboe Bakar Al Habsy, one of the Deputy of the 
PKS explained that, “This is not because of our cadres training or party 
machine cease working, but it is due to the PKS’ financial limitation” 
(Merdeka.com, 12 July 2012). Nevertheless, his claim was not entirely 
accurate by looking at the campaign expenditure of Jokowi and Fauzi 
Bowo. These figures confirm the previous studies that campaign expen-
ditures are not guaranteeing electoral success. However, the relatively 
small amount of funds spent by Jokowi and Purnama as challengers is 
quite unusual. Different variables other than money were surely work-
ing in this context.
Wahid’s expenditures were not too different from Jokowi’s expen-
ditures in the first round although he had arranged many campaign 
activities, including online media to inform the public about his vi-
sion and activities. Despite his efforts, it seems that his campaign was 
not able to attract significant numbers of Jakartans. However, he still 
obtained 11 percent of votes showing that there were pockets of votes 
in favor with his candidacy. One of the answers of this is the ability of 
the PKS to mobilize its members for election. The PKS is known as 
the only political party that has been able to mobilize its members to 
conduct on-political activities to protest bad practices in the country 
and performs such extra constitutional activities as humanitarian mis-
sions (Muhtadi 2012). Therefore, members in all regions are engaged 
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in electoral tasks to help the party’s candidate since the party’s member 
are heavily involved in the electoral process. 
One of the best political strategies of the PKS is political canvass-
ing which was proven crucial in winning some of the local elections, 
particularly in West Java as well as the national election in 2004. It is 
the strategy that members of a party visit every community household 
and introduce particular party or candidate for election hoping that the 
eligible member(s) of the household vote for them. The PKS conducts 
this strategy in every election either national or local, including the 
Jakarta election. Party members who conduct this activity are usually 
trained by the party to develop skills and boost confidence in facing 
unexpected reaction from the community. They also ask for permission 
from community leader beforehand so that their presence in a com-
munity is legal. During the visit, the party members do not have any 
obligation to impose their candidate if the person they visit is reluctant. 
In that case, they only suggest giving a reminder that the election is 
coming in the following weeks or days and ask her/him to register and 
vote at the ballot box.
With this kind of approach, there was no guarantee that the per-
son who has been visited by the party’s members would automatically 
agree to vote. In the USA, the effectiveness of this strategy has been 
widely discussed with mixed conclusion. Some argue that it only gives 
inconsiderable effects on how voters behave while others explain that 
it provides more chances to win an election (Gerber & Green 1999). 
Although it has an effect on electoral success, it will only apply to cer-
tain candidates. Therefore, the party’s claim that its political canvassing 
strategy is part its success in previous elections, national and local, can 
be easily misleading. It is proven that the strategy cannot boost the 
electability of Wahid although the PKS has a good record of success in 
the previous election.
Jokowi’s success also confirms that the absence of canvassing as 
his campaign strategy does not have any correlation with insignifi-
cant votes. He and his team implemented community visit rather than 
household visit and his team uploaded his visit to meet with the com-
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munity in slum areas promising to improve their neighborhood with the 
concepts of ‘kampong deret’ and free health service (KJS). His belief 
that city development should start from Kampong was more appealing 
than the idea of other candidates, including Wahid who merely prom-
ised to increase the budget for a community without giving concrete 
program for the extra funds. However, the most influential effect of 
Jokowi derives from media.
Media Endorsement
As a non-regional leader, Wahid and Rachbini did not have any strong 
appeal for urban issues and many of their programs were neither attractive 
nor concrete to be consumed heavily by media. From months before the 
election, the attention of the media had been focusing on the incumbent 
and potential contenders such as Alex Noerdin and Faisal Basri. Noerdin 
even grabbed more attention at the early months prior to the election as 
he spent more to advertise him at various media (either online, newspa-
per, or television). Fauzi Bowo then dominated the media afterward by 
ordering more advertising about him. However, Jokowi became the media 
favorite just weeks before the first round. His winning as the front-runner 
at the first round election may well explain the tendency, while the mon-
ey spent on advertisement contracts is reported higher than others are 
in the early months (AJI 2012, 57). Nevertheless, it has to be underlined 
that the media coverage has given more attention to Jokowi even before 
his announcement as the candidate from PDIP because of his excellent 
record as mayor of Solo and a possible move to race for gubernatorial 
position in Jakarta. Wahid was an immediate candidate after the PKS did 
not find any agreement with other political parties to support candidate 
together. As a result, media attention was relatively minimal when com-
pared to others. It is reflected in the findings of a research conducted by 
AJI revealing that he only recorded over 300 news of him. This figure is 
relatively low when compared to that of Jokowi (nearly 700) and Fauzi 
Bowo (more than 500) (56). 
Jokowi had become a political star in Solo. As a mayor, he had 
recorded many achievements that had been impossibly achieved by 
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other mayors. His ability to relocate street sellers without any conflict 
has amazed the public and the winning record of 91 percent for his sec-
ond period as mayor confirms this as well. He has also a lot of creative 
ideas to tackle the problems in Solo that may become the alternative 
leadership to other regions. With this success and public expectation for 
alternative leadership, media captured this opportunity and broadcast 
him more after the momentum of his announcement to use a car pro-
duced by Indonesian mechanical secondary school as mayor official car. 
Starting from his brave announcement about the local product pref-
erence, he turned into a public figure and even political celebrity. A 
social analyst for ICG wrote that ‘He may not be a Jakartan but there 
is no politician Indonesian broadcasters love more than the telegenic 
Jokowi, who in his trademark of the checked shirt is comfortably talk-
ing with people in slums and vocal in fighting corruption’ (Sukarsono 
2012). As a consequence, the public is also driven by the media cover-
age to accept his achievement. Mietzner has a similar impression for 
Jokowi that it is a combination of a creative campaign team to use 
popular culture and intensive coverage by media and it has increased 
his popularity in Jakarta (Sambhi 2013). 
According to Nugroho (2012), the intensive coverage is related to 
uniquely distinctive character and approach of Jokowi in the politics of 
Indonesia. His uniqueness has attracted is attractive to media to have 
news on him. After his inauguration as governor the coverage went on 
and some of his meetings led by him or by vice governor can reach 
more than a million of hits in social media. Journalists competed for 
each other to follow him every day to have a headline about him. 
Media effect is quite powerful in deciding the fate of the competi-
tion because his contenders, Fauzi Bowo and Wahid are having differ-
ent space and perception in the media. Fauzi Bowo was perceived as 
a failed governor as he was unable to solve the frustrating problems in 
Jakarta. His magic word of ‘give it to the expert’ in undermining Ad-
ang Daradjatun, a vice police chief, in the local election of 2007 had 
turned against him after five years in office. Fauzi Bowo’s ‘rigid style 
and distanced relation to the people’ (Yew-Foong & Bhakti 2012) had 
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made him unpopular for media and the right angle to cover him as the 
incumbent was his inability to build better Jakarta. His style was also 
difficult to reach young voters and those who were more technologically 
savvy in the social media, a strategy that was admitted as his weakness. 
Wahid also had a problem in front of the media. Although he and his 
success team have strived to develop an image that fitted with his and 
his vice candidate credential, he was not at the center of media cover-
age. It was always between Fauzi Bowo and Jokowi (AJI 2012).
CONCLUSION
The nomination of Hidayat Nur Wahid in the 2012 Jakarta election 
was an immediate decision by the PKS. He and his party only had one 
month to make preparation which later had to be altered to support a 
different candidate. This has put the party in a difficult situation to 
develop a suitable and convincing appeal to the Jakartans. The party 
depended greatly on his personal reputation as a religious and humble 
person who obtained a doctorate degree in Islamic Studies from Madi-
nah. He is known as a respectable person and relatively popular among 
Indonesian public after serving as the head of People’s Consultative 
Assembly. Among other candidates, only Fauzi Bowo has the similar 
overseas degree. 
This aspect of legitimacy for the candidate in the local election 
seems to be the only legitimate variable that Wahid has. He lacked two 
other factors to be the real contender: political resources and media 
coverage. He had insufficient sources to convince the voters of the gu-
bernatorial position as he had no experience in local politics and deal-
ing with issues in urban politics. In the campaign, he strived to position 
himself as a person for all by maximising symbols of color and batik. 
He seemed to minimise the usage of Islamic symbols as he thought his 
personality as Muslim was already in the public’s mind. However, his 
and the party’s effort to penetrate plural communities in Jakarta, beyond 
identity lines, did not work very well due to the growing rationality of 
the voters. He and his campaign team were unable to be more popular 
by maximising popular culture and creative approach. Many of the 
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videos produced by the party’s media team were old fashioned and he 
was not interested in media coverage to increase his popularity forcing 
his team to depend on canvassing. The latter strategy seemed to be ef-
fective to penetrate members of the community but its effectiveness to 
change voter behavior is doubtful both in theory and practice.
It is also important to note that the pattern of communication used 
by candidates has changed significantly. Conventional media was not 
the only medium for the voters to get information as there is a tendency 
to use direct communication strategy through online media, social me-
dia, or face-to-face meeting. Wahid and Rachbini campaign team had 
taken optimal efforts to utilize this media. However, their conventional 
approach during community visit and their uploaded videos were not 
attractive. Likewise, Fauzi Bowo suffered the similar fate as Jokowi has 
maximised his popularity as mayor of Solo and his humble but effective 
campaign strategy. 
Jakarta local election confirms that the figure of a candidate does 
still matters. However, a particular figure is more important than others. 
For such Islamic parties as the PKS, having a strong personal character 
in term of religiosity and positive behavior based on religious values 
is inadequate. An anti-corruption as depicted by the Islamic party is 
not attractive enough since there is no evidence that personal honesty 
will also be effective in improving local bureaucracy and solving the 
problems in the city. Experience, in particular, previous success, and 
expectation are partly influential as shown by Jokowi, a variable absent 
in Wahid and Rachbini. In short, unless Islamic parties are able to of-
fer a candidate with a capacity to tackle urban problems it seems that 
urban votes are highly unlikely to be on their side, although they share 
the similar religious identity.
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